Harness manifest — components, budgets and frozen safety paths¶
A harness is not one prompt. It is a system prompt, tool descriptions, tool implementations, middleware, skills, sub-agents and memory. Rewriting that tree as one opaque artifact makes attribution and safety impossible: an edit is not traceable to a component, and the safety-critical files are not frozen.
agentdescent.harness_manifest is the file-level contract:
agentdescent harness manifest --spec harness.json
agentdescent harness check --spec harness.json --changes changes.json
The manifest¶
{
"schema_version": 1,
"max_files": 10,
"max_lines": 400,
"allowed_paths": ["**"],
"forbidden_paths": ["secrets/**"],
"components": [
{"name": "prompt", "paths": ["prompts/**"],
"responsibility": "system_prompt", "max_lines": 80},
{"name": "tools", "paths": ["tools/**"],
"responsibility": "tool_policy", "max_files": 3},
{"name": "safety", "paths": ["safety/**"], "frozen": true,
"responsibility": "safety_memory"},
{"name": "tests", "paths": ["tests/**"], "frozen": true,
"responsibility": "rule_bank"}
]
}
responsibility mirrors the RRSI component vocabulary (context_mgmt,
client_tool, skill, memory, subagent) and SHE's safety decomposition:
system_prompt, tool_policy, tool_impl, rule_bank, safety_memory,
skill, subagent, middleware, context_mgmt, client_tool, memory,
other.
frozen: true (or editable: false) makes every path in the component
read-only. Every matching component applies: a path that matches both an
editable component and a frozen one is read-only, whatever the listing order.
Budgets are charged to every component that matches, so a catch-all cannot hide
a later component's max_files / max_lines.
Paths are matched with the tree's own glob semantics, not fnmatch: * matches
within one path segment, ** spans segments, ? and [...] work as usual, and
a bare directory pattern (tests) also matches its whole subtree. Use ** to
mean "any depth" -- src/*.py does not match src/sub/x.py.
What check validates¶
--changes is a JSON mapping path -> content (or a list of paths). The check
is fail-closed and reports every violation in one pass:
- path outside
allowed_paths, or matchingforbidden_paths; - no component owns the path;
- the component is frozen / not editable;
- the component's
max_filesormax_lines; - the manifest's global
max_files/max_lines.
It exits 0 when valid, 1 for a violation and 2 for a malformed manifest or
changes file. require_valid() is the same rule as an exception.
Wiring it into a tree¶
manifest.tree_kwargs() returns the FileTree keyword arguments:
from agentdescent import FileTree, load_tree
from agentdescent.harness_manifest import load_manifest
manifest = load_manifest("harness.json")
strategy = FileTree(load_tree("my-agent"), **manifest.tree_kwargs())
editable is the union of editable component globs, frozen the union of
frozen and editable: false ones. There is no ** fallback: if every
component is read-only, editable is empty. A path outside every component is
not editable by the loop, which is the point: a manifest that does not name a
file cannot silently authorise it. harness check is the same rule on the same
matcher: every matching component applies, read-only wins over editable, and
listing order is not part of the contract.
Boundaries¶
- This is the contract and the checker, not the runner. It does not execute the
harness;
code_runner/tree_runnerstill own the rollout and the test gate. - It does not decide acceptance; the existing verifier/promotion path does.
- A single
harness.jsonmaps one tree. For multiple harnesses, keep one manifest per tree and pass the matchingtree_kwargs().